A dark room

The behavior of those angry young officers played a decisive role during those crucial hours in the Pentagon courtyard, because they frightened King Constantine with their shouting and cheering, with their chants supporting the “Revolution.” Stylianos Pattakos, one of the leaders of the coup, recalled how the king fumed over the conduct of the assembled officers, who did not observe even the most basic rules of military discipline: “He came and told me ‘Brigadier General, please bring them to order.’ I said, ‘They are clapping, they are cheering, they’re not harming anyone. But in any case, I’ll go and talk to them.’ And I said ‘Calm down’ and they did.” 4 Constantine justified his inability to react on the morning of 21 April by describing the “horrific” situation he encountered during his meeting with the legitimate Prime Minister of the country, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, who was being kept prisoner in a Pentagon office. Kanellopoulos advised him to stand up to the coup, and the King took him to the window, showed him the young army officers below, and told him: “I control nothing. How can I arrest them, by force of will alone?… They are armed.” 5 DISAPPOINTMENT OVER THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE GREEK DIVISION FROM CYPRUS The younger officers, who considered themselves the backbone of the “Revolution,” were even more disappointed with Papadopoulos when, in November 1967, under pressure from Turkey and the United States, withdrew the Greek Army Division which had been stationed in Cyprus since 1964. Turkey had threatened to invade because of a clash that took place in the village of Kofinou, during a clean-up operation orchestrated by the commander of the Greek forces, General Georgios Grivas. President Lyndon Johnson dispatched Cyrus Vance as his envoy, who managed to avert the Turkish invasion but convinced the King of Greece, the Greek Prime Minister Kontantinos Kollias, and Georgios Papadopoulos, to recall the Greek forces which had been secretly transported to the island. “When the Division was recalled, discontent in the army reached a new high,” Charalambos Palainis recalled, and added: “It was then that we decided that Papadopoulos had to be removed.” 6 This was corroborated by his brother, who said that “when he recalled the Division which had been sent to Cyprus by Georgios Papandreou, and which acted as a strong deterrent for Turkey, we decided to overthrow Papadopoulos.” 7 One more army officer who would play a crucial role later on, Thanasis Perdikis, believes that “the recall of the Division was a tragic mistake which Ioannidis was quick to take advantage of.” 8 For these officers, as for Ioannidis himself, who had served with them in Cyprus after its independence, the union with Greece was the “Holy Grail” of national aspirations, an organic part of a new “Great Idea.” The withdrawal of the Greek Division dealt a heavy blow to the credibility, not only of the regime but of Papadopoulos himself, even if the officers still believed that the one responsible for the demise of the vision of the union was the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios. They also thought that Papadopoulos was too willing to compromise, prepared to come to terms with the King and the previous establishment. Charalambos Palainis was greatly disappointed when, shortly after the King’s failed counter-coup, on 13 December 1967, Papadopoulos attended the graduation ceremony in the Hellenic Army Academy