A dark room

enough. After reading thousands of pages in US and Greek archives, two things stand out in my mind because they illustrate perfectly his particularly ingenious brand of cynicism: A few days before the Turkish invasion and the return of Karamanlis to Greece, a number of diplomats insisted that the United States should overthrow Ioannidis’ regime in order to prevent the unbridled anti-American sentiments that would surely emerge in the event of an invasion. This invited Kissinger’s scorn: “Let me remind everyone, we are the State Department, not a Political Science Department,” and went on, with prophetic realism: “Karamanlis will come to Greece, a violent leftist movement will emerge, the Left will be legitimized, and in ten years, Andreas Papandreou will come into power. But we’ll deal with him when the time comes. Βesides, I know him personally.” Following the second phase of the invasion, Kissinger briefed President Ford, who had just been sworn into office, and got straight to the point: “There is no reason we shouldn’t let Turkey have one third of Cyprus.” Except for Ioannidis and Kissinger, the people who knew the secrets of that intense summer were the CIA officers who had been tasked with the Cyprus issue. Key among them was Gast Avrakotos. I tried to reach him, but it proved impossible. I managed to obtain his house number with great difficulty. His wife answered the phone and told me in no uncertain terms that her husband suffered from dementia, and that I should leave him alone. The other key figure, the Greek-American Peter Koromilas, also sent notice that he had nothing to say and wouldn’t meet with me. But I was fortunate, because in the course of my investigation, I met certain people who honestly believed that grievous mistakes—if not outright crimes—had been committed by the United States in 1974, and wanted to help me get some answers. They helped me locate Ron Estes, a retired CIA operative. He was the man who, along with Avrakotos, met with Ioannidis just before the overthrow of Makarios. At first, Estes was very tight-lipped. He gave the impression he was telling the story the way he wanted it to be, or perhaps the way the Agency he had served for many years wanted it to be. However, when we met at his home in a retired community in Florida, he opened up. He basically revealed to me that the primary objective of the CIA was to avert a war between Greece and Turkey after the Turkish invasion in Cyprus. He succeeded through a combination of disinformation, some blackmail, and, as he said, the help of certain senior officers who were “sources” controlled by the CIA. Will this book solve every mystery? I believe that many things will be cleared up. Not everything, obviously. Ioannidis and Avrakotos have already taken their secrets to the grave. I’m convinced that the most crucial discussions of those dramatic days in 1974 were never recorded. Twenty-five years have passed since the day that I started my investigation into that troubled period. Over the years, many esteemed colleagues have lent their assistance. Michalis Ignatiou is one of them, with the classic treatise he co-wrote with Kostas Venizelos. Many documents in United States archives were declassified and threw light on certain aspects of the issue. In the course of my investigation I was assisted by Ilias Vlanton, who taught me the meaning of archival research and historical investigation. My good friend Mehmet Ali Birand, the legendary Turkish journalist who passed away in 2013, helped me see the matter through the eyes of the opposite side, and often told me: “You’ll hear many theories, by why are they searching for this or that thing? Pay them no heed, and focus on our great ‘mistress,’ research.”